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Abstract
Network routers are a core component of contemporary SoHo networks. The firmware within these devices
provides routing, control and monitoring functionality coupled with mechanisms to ensure a secure and reliable
network. End-users are typically reliant on manufacturers to provide timely firmware updates to mitigate known
vulnerabilities. An investigation was undertaken to identify the underlying software components used in the
firmware of currently available, SoHo network devices used in Australia. Firmware from 37 devices was
deconstructed to identify potential security issues; in each instance, the firmware images were found to include
vulnerabilities, obsolete software and out-of-date operating system components. 95% of the deconstructed
firmware was based on Linux. The Linux kernels identified were typically discontinued and are no longer
actively maintained. This paper demonstrates a method for undertaking the analysis and summaries the
outcomes of the research.
Keywords
Network routers, firmware updates, firmware vulnerabilities, firmware currency

INTRODUCTION
Network device security is an issue for end-users, police and lawmakers alike. Network routers manage the
connectivity between an end-user’s home network and the Internet. As a result the in-built security in network
routers often provides the first and last line of defence for potential cyber-attacks. A security breach of a network
router may allowsa cyber criminal or malicious software unauthorised access to an end-user’s network and the
internal resources (Jones, 2012). Insecure network devices may also affect other users by allowing attackers to
launch further attacks from a compromised device (Krebs, 2015).
Insecure network devices also impact police and lawmakers. Online computer crimes require an Internet
connection, which may leave forensic evidence in the form of logs, Internet Protocol (IP) address details or even
device connection statistics. Prosecuting computer-assisted crimes often requires proof of an individual’s
network identity. Compromised network devices may provide malicious actors with a suitable defence, or even
falsely identify innocent parties as perpetrators (Bryant, 2009). Some overseas jurisdictions are considering laws
that require citizens to secure their networking devices. BBC News (2010) reported that a German citizen was
fined for not securing their Wi-Fi network. The publication Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and
the Law (Personick & Patterson, 2003) identifies home users as a major source of security hazards; and, asks
whether end-users should be held accountable for poor device management and security practices. However, Ho,
Dearman and Truong (2010) argue that implementing adequate security on Small office Home office (SoHo)
network devices is overly complex for the typically end-user. As a consequence, network devices may remain
unaltered following the initial install and configuration.
Cyber criminals may exploit well-documented vulnerabilities that rely on poor security and update practices
(Denning, Kohno & Levy, 2013) . In order to curb malicious access and help improve personal security, several
police jurisdictions provide users with advice on best practices for protecting themselves from cyber crime. Both
Queensland and Western Australian police advise that network device firmware – the device’s internal operating
system and software components – should be actively managed by checking for and applying firmware updates
(Western Australia Police, n.d.). This advice is predicated on the fact that network device manufacturers are
actively updating the device’s firmware as new security issues and vulnerabilities are discovered.
Firmware is the operating system and software applications that are installed on a device to manage and control
network communication and provide a graphical user interface to the end-user. A standalone firmware release
may contain thousands of operating system files, libraries and executable software applications. Core
functionality of the firmware’s operating system is provided by software called the kernel. The kernel is the
‘gatekeeper’ for all low-level security and hardware management activities (Love, 2010). It provides the
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operating framework and controls access to components including the file-system, Random Access Memory
(RAM), network interfaces, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports. The remaining operating system consists of
utility programs and system libraries, which provide an abstraction layer between high-level software (like a
user-interface) and the low-level system management operations. Utility programs like the operating system
“command shell”; network configuration applications; and firewall management tools, simplify access to system
resources. Libraries provide common functionality that may be shared across multiple parts of the operating
system and applications. High-level executable applications provide features like: the end-user configuration
wizards; built-in webservers; firewall services; internet access protocols; and user and password management
tools. Some network devices may also include value added applications that are not directly related to network
access. These may include applications like: file servers; digital media players; printer servers; or personal cloud
storage services. Firmware features rely on the complex interactions between many executable files, libraries and
kernel components. These are linked together and communicate by passing information along many chains of
linked components. The security of the firmware’s operating system is reliant on the strength and reliability of
these chains and linked components.
The security and stability of SoHo network devices is subject to the reliability and quality of its firmware release
(Papp, Ma & Buttyan, 2015). As firmware ages, new vulnerabilities are uncovered by researchers, cyber
criminals or enthusiasts. Well-supported firmware is regularly updated and has security vulnerabilities addressed
in a timely manner. It is the responsibility of manufacturers to ensure that all operating system components are
based on secure, well-supported software; and, to ensure that there are no flawed links in the chain of firmware
components.
Firmware components were previously analysed by Costin, Zaddach, Francillon, and Balzarotti (2014), who
developed an automated system for scanning and examining firmware. They developed a suite of tools to locate
firmware images, and subsequently unpack and analyse their components. Using this method, Costin et al.
(2014) were able to identify previously unknown vulnerabilities in hundreds of firmware files located on
manufacturer websites. Costin et al. (2014) examined the use of fuzzy hashing techniques to recognise almost
identical files. For normal hashes: two matching hash values, for two separate files, provide statistical certainty
that the file contents are identical. Unfortunately, this certainty is a source of error when attempting to match
‘almost’ identical files, as changing a single byte within a file, will result in an unpredictable different hash
value. Files that are functionally identical yet differ in size and content are frequently identified in compiled
software applications. This is because the same application, compiled from identical sources, can be assembled
differently depending on a range of settings at the time of compilation (file creation). As such, simple hash-wise
comparison of firmware components may not yield useful information. The method used by Costin et al. (2014)
used a type of fuzzy hashing technique to divide large files into small components and examine these component
based on hashes. Whilst powerful, the aforementioned method is computationally expensive.
Based on the obvious need for network device security, coupled the findings of Costin et al. (2014) this research
undertook a targeted in-depth survey of SoHo network devices in Australia. As most SoHo router firmware is
based on open-source operating systems and components (Jones, 2012), it was theorised that a holistic view of
device firmware currency and manufacturer security practices, could be obtained by more direct component
version identification strategies. This research survey attempted to create and validate a proof of concept method
for extracting and identifying component version information from firmware images; and, an overview of
firmware currency for a range of SoHo network devices currently being sold or offered to consumers in
Australia.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN
The research questions to be addressed through this research paper were;
1.
2.

Can a method by developed to identify component version information for SoHo router firmware
images?
Are SoHo router firmware images secure and using up-to-date software components?

The questions were addressed by analysing current network device models to determine the underlying software
components contained within the latest firmware release. The latest firmware for each device was downloaded
from the manufacture’s support web page. The firmware’s content were extracted for component version
analysis. The version number and release dates were recorded for each firmware release and compared to the
version numbers and release dates for selected firmware components.
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Unpacking firmware image content
In order to identify the core components of a firmware release, a combination of Linux based tools and utilities
were used to access the firmware’s binary content. Each firmware image was first run through the binwalk
application to extract its contents. Binwalk is an open source analysis and reverse engineering tool for firmware
images (Binwalk, 2015).

$ binwalk -e FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img
DECIMAL
HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
0x0
TRX firmware header, little endian, header size: 28 bytes, image size: 15142912 bytes,
CRC32: 0xC4CEA69F flags: 0x0, version: 1
28
0x1C LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size:
5494368 bytes
2319408
0x236430
Squashfs file-system, little endian, version 4.0, compression:lzma (nonstandard type definition), size: 12818155 bytes, 3022 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, created: Fri Jul 11
11:04:22 2014
Figure 1 – Sample firmware extraction using binwalk to reveal the Squashfs file-system
After extraction with binwalk, any embedded file-systems were unpacked to reveal the firmware’s operating
system, files and configurations. Depending on the file-system type, different extraction utilities were used.
Firmware containing “Squash-FS” file-systems were extracted using “sasquatch”, while JFFS file-systems were
mounted directly using built in Linux modules.
$ cd _FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img.extracted
$ ls -l
total 32680
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout 5494368 Sep 24 11:35 1C
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout 15143140 Sep 24 11:35 1C.7z
-rw-r--r-- 1 501 dialout 12818155 Sep 24 11:36 236430.squashfs
#sasquatch 236430.squashfs
SquashFS version [4.0] / inode count [3011] suggests a SquashFS image of the same endianess
Parallel unsquashfs: Using 1 processor
Trying to decompress using default xz decompressor...
Successfully decompressed with default xz decompressor
2786 inodes (2917 blocks) to write
…
…
created 2299 files
created 225 directories
created 496 symlinks
created 0 devices
created 0 fifos
Figure 2 - Squash-fs extraction using sasquatch
Device firmware was downloaded and extracted to an organised directory structure identified by
manufacturer/device/firmware_release. Examination of component version information was accomplished using
readily available Linux programs and commands. This allowed for scripting searches across all extracted content
from multiple manufacturers and devices simultaneously.

13

$ ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 136 Sep 16 12:02 avm
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 170 Sep 16 12:02 billion
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 170 Sep 16 12:02 budii
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 578 Sep 13 12:30 dlink
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 238 Sep 24 11:31 linksys
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 204 Sep 14 14:46 netcomm
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 578 Sep 25 10:10 netgear
drwxr-xr-x 1 501 dialout 374 Sep 16 12:02 tplink
$ ls -l linksys/XAC1900/_FW_XAC1900_1.1.42.162280_prod.img.extracted/squashfs-root/
total 16
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 2958 Sep 25 16:19 bin
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 68 Jul 11 2014 cgroup
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 68 Jul 11 2014 dev
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 2448 Jul 11 2014 etc
…
drwx------ 1 501 dialout 646 Jul 11 2014 www
$ find . -name "busybox"
./avm/Fritz7490/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox
./avm/Fritz7490/fmk/rootfs/squashfs-root/bin/busybox
./billion/7800NXL/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox
./billion/7800VDPX/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox
…
./dlink/DAP-1650/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox
…
Figure 3 - Extracted file-system content of “find” operation to identify BusyBox files across firmware images

FIRMWARE CURRENCY EVALUATION
To examine firmware currency based on included components, the firmware images were scanned for known
elements. These were in turn analysed to identify version numbers and subsequently release dates. The firmware
kernel and command shell were chosen for identification as they represent a significant part of an operating
system’s security and control architecture. Other libraries and executables were chosen to help develop proof of
concept version identification strategies and provide a holistic assessment of device firmware currency by
examining component level information. Components selected for version analysis are shown below in Table 1.
Table 1 - Components selected for version identification

COMPONENT
Linux Kernel

FUNCTION
Provides core operating system functionality.

BusyBox

Provides the operating system “shell” which allows
interaction between components using commands
and scripts.
Security and encryption library. Used to provide
identity verification and signatures for a range of
secure applications.
Provides interfaces to configure kernel network
firewall features.
Media server able to send media files to network
media players (Televisions, Play Station 4, Xbox
360 etc.).

OpenSSL

iptables
MiniDLNA

SSHd

Secure Shell Daemon. Provides remote access to a
device through a secure “command” shell.

VERSION SOURCE
https://www.kernel.org/
(Linux Kernel Organization, n.d.)
http://www.busybox.net/
(Andersen, 2015)
http://www.netfilter.org/
(OpenSSL Software Foundation,
2015)
http://www.netfilter.org/
(Welte & Ayuso, 2014)
http://sourceforge.net/projects/mi
nidlna/
(Maggard, 2015)
+ Internet searches
http://www.openssh.com/
(OpenBSD, 2009)
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Version identification was achieved through a range of strategies, which were developed for each specific target
component or application. While some libraries and applications contain an easily recognisable version string for
example “version=1.2.3”, others may be programed or compiled with constructions that require reverse
engineering or more complex searches to identify version information. The strategies developed for each
compiled binary are shown in Table 2.
Identified versions numbers of firmware component files were compared to known version numbers found in
each application’s source code or online “project pages”. Project pages and Google searches were used to
identify the most accurate source for the most specific or earliest mention of the component’s version number.

Identification of the kernel version number
Each firmware’s kernel version was identified by examining strings available in kernel modules. These modules
typically contain a static “version magic” string that identifies the kernel version for which it was made
(Salzman, Burian, & Pomerantz, 2005). Regular expression matches and the Linux egrep utility were used to
identify the “vermagic=” string and indicated version numbers. The version numbers and original release dates
for each kernel were identified using the data from the Linux kernel archives website (Linux Kernel
Organization, n.d.).
$ find . -name "*.ko"|head -1 | xargs egrep -a -o –i -b "vermagic=.*"
74256:vermagic=2.6.36.4
Figure 4 - Identification of kernel version

Identify the operating system BusyBox ‘command shell’ version number
BusyBox includes its version details and compile time information in an embedded static string. This can be
extracted by using regular expression searches – the same way as kernel version numbers were identified.
$ find . -name "busybox" | xargs egrep -a -o -b "BusyBox v.*"
./billion/7800NXL/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:317007:BusyBox v1.17.2 …
./dlink/DSL-2544N/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:344412:BusyBox v1.6.1 …
./netcomm/3G29WN/fmk/rootfs/bin/busybox:190302:BusyBox v1.00 …
…
Figure 5 - Identification of BusyBox “Shell” version

Other component specific search and version identification strategies
For other applications, certain string sequences were identified from project websites, or through reverse
engineering of the binary files to identify symbolic placeholders and offsets within the executable file or
associated libraries. A summary of component specific search strategies is provided below in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Search strategies used for software version identification

COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES
COMPONENT:
Linux Kernel
STRATEGY:
Examination of .ko kernel modules for “vermagic=” string.
 Find a kernel module usually files ending in .ko
 Search through the .ko file using grep/egrep
 Search Expression: “vermagic.*”
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
$find . -name "*.ko" |head -1|xargs egrep -a -o –i -b "vermagic=.*"
EXAMPLE RESULT:
74256:vermagic=2.6.36.4
COMPONENT:
BusyBox Shell
STRATEGY:
Examination of /bin/busybox binary file.
 Check if bin/busybox exists
 Search through busybox binary using grep/egrep
 Search Expression: “BusyBox .*”
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
$egrep -a -o -b "BusyBox .*" squashfs-root/bin/busybox
EXAMPLE RESULT:
489504:BusyBox v1.15.2 (2014-07-10 17:36:08 PDT)
COMPONENT:
OpenSSL/libssl
STRATEGY:
Examination of known version ‘patterns’ for libssl library version numbers
 Search for possible three part version numbers and optional ‘letters’
 Sanity check against known libssl versions
 Search Expression: "[0-2]\.[0-9]\.[0-9][a-z]*"
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
#find . -name "libssl.so.*" | xargs egrep -a -o -b -i "[0-2]\.[0-9]\.[0-9][a-z]*"
EXAMPLE RESULT:
…
212922:0.9.8za
…
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COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES
COMPONENT:
iptables
STRATEGY:
Versions of iptables since 2002 have been numbered between 1.2.7 and 1.4.21.
 Find iptables files
 Search for string sequence matches with similar numbering conventions.
 Sanity check for version number and release date from iptables website
 Search Expression: “1.[2-4].[0-9]{1,2}.*”
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
$ find . -name "iptables" | xargs egrep -a -o -b "1.[2-4].[0-9]{1,2}"
EXAMPLE RESULT:
54193:1.4.12
COMPONENT:
MiniDLNA (media server)
STRATEGY:
The excutable contains the strings “MiniDLNA version ..”
 Find minidlna files
 Search for string sequence containing “MiniDLNA version”
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
$ find . –name “minidlna” | xargs egrep –a –o –b –I “MiniDLNA version .*”
EXAMPLE RESULT:
usr/bin/minidlna:176524:MiniDLNA version 1.0.24 [SQLite %s]
COMPONENT:
SSHd
STRATEGY:
Examination of multiple source files showed dropbear sshd being used (Johnston, 2015). The name
dropbear is included in the version string. This also gave clues as to the version numbering for SSHd
servers not including the dropbear string.
 Identify dropbear_versions
 Identify remaining SSHd versions
 Requilar expression match for dropbear
 String search for 0.[4-5]* in other versions
EXAMPLE COMMANDS:
$ find . -name "sshd" | xargs egrep -s -a -o -b -i "dropbear.*\.[4-5][0-9]*"
EXAMPLE RESULTS:
… bin/sshd:187009:dropbear_0.46
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COMPONENT SPECIFIC SEARCH AND VERSION IDENTIFICATION STARTEGIES
COMPONENT:
sqlite
STRATEGY:
Reverse engineering of SQLite3 showed that the libsqlite3.so shared object library contained the
version number.
 Retrieve the symbol for sqlite3_version using readelf –s and grep
 Read the offset of the symbol from the readelf command
 Read the ‘length’ from the output from the readelf command
 Use DD to read out the version string using previously identified offset and bytes
EXAMPLE COMMAND (STEP 1):
$ readelf -s libsqlite3.so | grep version
EXAMPLE RESULT (STEP 1):
235: 00062494 6 OBJECT GLOBAL DEFAULT 13 sqlite3_version
EXAMPLE COMMAND (STEP 2):
$ dd if=libsqulite3.so bs=1 skip=$((0x62494)) count=6
EXAMPLE RESULT (STEP 2):
3.5.8

Firmware Extracted for Analysis
The firmware for 37 devices were downloaded from manufacture websites. The firmware release dates were
identified from manufacturer release notes and filenames. The firmware releases were downloaded, extracted
and the search strategies were executed. The examination was conducted on the following firmware images:

Table 3 - Device model, firmware and sources
Model
Billion 7800NXL

Firmware
Date
27/05/15

Source
(see section Error! Reference source not found.)
Billion Electric Co. Ltd. (2014e)

Billion 7800VDPX

27/05/15

Billion Electric Co. Ltd. (2014e)

D-Link DIR-850L

24/07/15

D-Link Australia (2015a)

D-Link DIR-890L

4/09/15

D-Link Australia (2015b, 2015c)

D-Link DSL-2544N

11/02/15

D-Link Australia (2014b, 2015d)

D-Link DSL-2750B

25/02/15

D-Link Australia (2014c)

D-Link DSL-2877AL

28/05/15

D-Link Australia (2015f)

D-Link DSL-2880AL

11/09/14

D-Link Australia (2014d, 2014e)

D-Link DSL-2890AL

7/05/15

D-Link Australia (2014f)

D-Link DSL-2900AL

8/05/15

D-Link Australia (2014g)

D-Link DWR-116

16/02/15

D-Link Australia (2015i)

FRITZ!Box 7490

27/08/15

AVM Computersysteme Vertriebs GmbH (2015)

iiNet Budii Lite

14/09/15

iiNet Limited (2015)

Linksys XAC1200

29/05/15

Belkin International (2015b)

Linksys WRT1900AC

18/06/15

Belkin International (2015a)

Linksys XAC1900-AU

15/07/14

Belkin International (2014)

NetComm 3G29WN

7/07/11

NetComm Wireless Limited (2011)
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Model
NetComm NB16WV-02

Firmware
Date
2/11/14

Source
(see section Error! Reference source not found.)
NetComm Wireless Limited (2014)

NetComm NB604N-02

29/04/15

NetComm Wireless Limited (2015)

NETGEAR CG3100D-2

5/04/12

NETGEAR (2012)

NETGEAR D6000-100AUS

24/06/15

NETGEAR (2015a)

NETGEAR D6200-100AUS

18/07/15

NETGEAR (2015b)

NETGEAR D6400-100AUS

18/07/15

NETGEAR (2015c)

NETGEAR DGN2200-100AUS

18/07/15

NETGEAR (2015d)

NETGEAR DM111P-100AUS

29/05/14

NETGEAR (2014)

NETGEAR R7000-100AUS

26/05/15

NETGEAR (2015e)

NETGEAR R8000-100AUS

28/05/15

NETGEAR (2015f)

NETGEAR WNDR3700-100AUS

2/04/15

NETGEAR (2015g)

NETGEAR WNR2000-200AUS

22/04/15

NETGEAR (2015h)

TP-LINK Archer C9

27/08/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015a)

TP-LINK Archer D2

2/09/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015b)

TP-LINK Archer D7

14/05/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015c)

TP-LINK Archer D9

14/05/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015d)

TP-LINK TD-8816

11/03/14

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2014a)

TP-LINK TD-W8961N

23/10/14

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2014b)

TP-LINK TD-W9980

7/05/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015e)

TP-LINK W-8968

4/05/15

TP-LINK Technologies Co. Ltd. (2015f)

RESULTS
An informal observation of major Australian retailers identified that six brands were typically sold including;
Netgear, D-Link, TP-Link, Linksys, Belkin, and NetComm. Internet Service Providers sell a combination of
OEM (self branded) devices, and specialist devices from iiNet (Budii), AVM (Fritz!Box) and Billion.
The firmware release dates were readily identifiable for all devices except for those manufactured by Netgear.
Most device manufacturers provide release notes that included the release date and any significant changes.
Netgear included a date with their release notes, but this was deemed unreliable, as the dates were inconsistent
and frequently different from information gleaned from web based searches and firmware file-system data. The
firmware release dates for Netgear devices were inferred from embedded file-system dates, compile time strings
and industry websites.
The analysed devices appeared to be well supported with newly released firmware updates. A quarter of
surveyed devices had new firmware released in the three months prior to the survey; and, a majority of devices
(84%) had new firmware released within the last year. All manufacturers except NetComm had an average
firmware age of less than 12 months. However, the limited number of devices from manufacturers like
NetComm meant average release dates were not necessarily indicative of the normal support frequency from
those manufacturers.
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5%
11%
Less than a year old
One to two years old
Older than two years
84%

Figure 6 - Age of latest firmware release according to release notes
The average firmware age is more significant for manufacturers with a larger number of devices represented in
the survey. Comparison of the three most represented manufacturers Netgear, D-Link and TP-Link showed
similar average firmware ages of nine months, six months, and seven months respectively.
Manufacturer

Average Firmware
Age (months)

Newest Device
Firmware (months)

Oldest Firmware
(months)

Devices in Survey
(count)

iiNet

1

1

1

1

FRITZ!Box

1

1

1

1

Billion

4

4

4

2

D-Link

6

1

13

9

TP-LINK

7

1

19

8

Linksys

8

4

15

3

NETGEAR

9

3

42

10

NetComm

22

5

51

3

Table 4 - Average, newest and oldest firmware by manufacturer
Nearly all devices relied upon open-source Linux distributions for their embedded firmware operating system.
Linux was the operating system in 95% of the deconstructed firmware; the exception was two TP-Link products
that were using the ThreadX a real-time-operating-system (Express Logic, 2014). Over 75% of the Linux kernel
versions identified were based on two versions: 2.6.30.x (42%) and 2.6.36.x (34%).
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5%

Linux 2.6.30

19%

Linux 2.6.36

42%

Other Linux
Non-Linux
34%

Figure 7 - Kernel versions represented in extracted firmware
The majority of Linux kernels identified were no longer actively maintained. The latest identified kernel was
based on Linux 2.6.36.4 and was declared end-of-life in 2011; developers and users were advised to move to
newer supported versions (Kroah-Hartman, 2011). Since Kroah-Hartman’s announcement, the 2.6.36 Linux
kernel has seen 66 CVE vulnerabilities registered (CVE, 2015a). Three devices were found to be using the
2.6.32 “long term release” kernel; however, their full version numbers (2.6.32.32 and 2.6.32.42) indicated
release dates in 2011. These two kernel versions include 44 CVE vulnerabilities including several remote
exploits (CVE, 2015b; CVE, 2015c). It is unclear as to whether the manufacturers of these three devices applied
patches or updates for newer 2.6.32 releases prior to firmware compilation. The Linux kernel community only
patches vulnerabilities in newer and supported kernels; patching vulnerabilities in obsolete kernels would be the
responsibility of the respective manufacturers.
Libraries and executable applications were also typically outdated or obsolete. The average age of firmware
library and executable components ranged from three to ten years. Out of 54 distinct software versions
identified, only two were released within the last two years and over half were over six years old. Every library
and executable identified had a more recent or more supported version available. Obsolete software and versions
with known security issues were found in every firmware image regardless of the manufacturer, device or
firmware release date.
Table 5 - Firmware component applications by average, newest and oldest version age
Application/Library
MiniDLNA
(media server)
SQLite
(Database)
Iptables
(firewall mgmt.)
Busybox
(shell)
OpenSSL
(crypto/signing)
SSHd
(ssh login serve)

Average
Age (Years)
3

Newest Version
(Years Old)
3

Oldest Version
(Age Years)
4

Found in # of
Firmware Images
6

4

1

7

14

5

2

12

25

6

3

11

32

7

1

10

17

10

6

10

12

DISCUSSION
On the surface, device firmware appears to be relatively well maintained by manufacturers. Most current devices
have received firmware releases within the year preceding the survey; however, upon closer examination, it is
clear that even the newest firmware updates fail to address the fundamental issue of obsolete components. The
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practice by most manufacturers appears to be that of building firmware that meets functional specifications and
shipping it without any reasonable attempt to maintain the currency of installed components, or addressing
component specific vulnerabilities (Constantin, 2014).
Every device running Linux was using a discontinued and unsupported kernel. The kernel acts as the
‘gatekeeper’ for all process, file-system and memory activities; it plays a core role in system management and
security, and it is essential that vulnerabilities are patched in a timely fashion. Cyber criminals, security experts
and software developers frequently identify vulnerabilities in kernels, shared libraries and applications.
Vulnerabilities need to be patched and versions updated in a timely manner, as once made public, these
vulnerabilities can be used to attack a device. Manufactures are responsible for ensuring faulty software is
patched, or upgraded to newer versions. The report OWASP Top 10 2013 - The Ten Most Critical Web
Application Security Risks (The OWASP Foundation, 2013), identifies the use of “known vulnerable
components” as a major risk to web application security; this advice is also applicable to firmware developers as
devices running old and un-patched software are primed for exploitation.
The security community and media organisations are easily excitable when it comes to zero-day exploits. These
types of new vulnerabilities are found in software with yet-to-be-released fixes, which leaves end-users
vulnerable. Little attention is afforded to the masses of obsolete, exploitable software built in to SoHo device
firmware. Obsolete software is potentially rife with many exploits that have been known for years, these well
understood exploits present perfect opportunities for cyber criminals. Older exploits typically have readily
available hacking scripts and tools that can be used to automate mass scale vulnerability scanning and device
attacks.
While major vulnerabilities are obvious, the survey revealed a deeper problem regarding the interaction between
multiple components. Complex software interactions create a situation in which minor programming errors or
exploits can be leveraged to completely compromise an entire network. For example, a minor fault in a media
server may permit an SQL injection attack, which in turn could affect a vulnerable database server, which can inturn feed in to the device’s operating system “shell”. It is necessary to take a holistic view of embedded firmware
to identify combinations of flawed components, configuration, and development practices that create conditions
conducive to security breaches.
Manufacturers appear to be pursuing the implementation of features with high visibility; the ‘coolest’ router,
with the fastest Wi-Fi, built-in home entertainment server and one that provides the best gaming support.
Marketing features are seducing end-users at the expense of good security practices. There appears to be no
incentive for manufacturers to improve firmware security as the focus continually shifts to the development of
new features to saturate the market (Constantin, 2014). There is also no simple way for users to evaluate the
security of their device’s firmware. Analysis of obsolete and discontinued firmware components is a technical
and laborious process requiring hours of expert analysis for each device. This complexity appears to be giving
device manufacturers the cover they need to continue using poor firmware development and security practices.
The pattern of manufacturers including obsolete components is unfortunately not surprising. It is consistent with
the observations of industry experts and commentators who have repeatedly voiced concerns over the poor state
of security in SoHo network devices (Armerding, 2015; Greene, 2015; Independent Security Evaluators, LLC.,
2015). Despite numerous warnings, very little seems to have changed. Fixing the state of SoHo router firmware
may require incentives and pressure at a higher level for the issue to be addressed.
A reward mechanism to recognise excellence in device firmware could provide end-user education and create an
incentive for manufacturers to improve their products. A “star-rating” similar to those used by energy-efficiency,
or vehicle safety ratings would benefit end-users. It may help to increase competition and improve accountability
in the SoHo router market. A star-rating system would need to be administered by independent assessors and
would need careful design to limit “gaming” of the system (Bevan & Hood, 2006).
The SoHo network device industry appears to have done nothing to develop or standardise security
requirements. Other industries have managed to self-regulate; for example, the payment card industry has
developed security standards which have been widely adopted (PCI Security Standards Council, LLC., 2015).
The opportunity exists for security researchers to work with the SoHo network device industry to develop a set
of security principles and practices that could be adopted by manufacturers.
Failing the adoption of an industry standard approach to security, legal and regulatory intervention may be
required. If manufacturers are knowingly including obsolete or broken firmware components, they may be
failing in their duty of care toward end-users. If it can be shown that manufactures have repeatedly included
these components against industry advice, it may suggest negligence on the part of manufacturers. A database
providing firmware audits at the component level may provide evidence that is of use to lawmakers and
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regulatory authorities. A device firmware component database could also assist with holistic analysis of
manufacturer development practices.
While it is understandable that software issues will occur, it appears that manufacturers are trying to wash their
hands of firmware liability; a brief review of manufacturer warranty information shows a reluctance to warrant
the suitability of device firmware or software (D-Link Australia, n.d.; NETGEAR, 2007; TP-LINK Technologies
Co. Ltd., n.d.); given that all SoHo devices are reliant upon firmware security, this situation and attitude cannot
be allowed to continue.

CONCLUSION
This research identified SoHo network devices that are currently available in the Australian market. It succeeded
in creating search strategies to accurately identify version information for: firmware operating system
components; libraries; and applications. The search strategies were able to run quickly and utilised Linux-based
tools and commands that were easily accessible and could be automated. The version information identified for
selected firmware components was analysed and showed that every SoHo network device contained obsolete
operating systems and software components.
An opportunity exists to create further automated firmware assessment tools. These tools could be used to
identify software versions from reverse engineered blocks of binary code. The tools could utilise a database of
customised search strategies for fast pattern matching. The tools could be used to scan manufacturer firmware
releases and provide reporting on the underlying components, versions and potential vulnerabilities. The tool
could be designed to produce technical reports for analysis by security professionals, as well as simplified
reporting to inform and educate end-users.
Further research should also be undertaken to examine the feasibility of incentive and regulatory mechanisms.
Research should identify ways to improve manufacturer security practices and transparency of embedded
firmware components. The research should seek to develop processes, tools and standards that can be applied to
assess and improve the security of SoHo device firmware.
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